Russia wants Africa to settle trade on payment systems that don’t run through Western banks. At the third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow last month, President Vladimir Putin made that one of his main proposals.
Putin said Russia and African countries should build a settlement system that uses their national currencies. He also argued that African countries’ dependence on Western financial systems limits their sovereignty.
The pitch serves Moscow’s own needs. Since the invasion of Ukraine, sanctions have cut Russia off from much of the global banking system. Africa’s trade, its growing use of crypto and its patchy payment links make it an obvious market for Russia’s alternative.
What Moscow Proposed
Speaking at the summit’s economic forum, Putin called for “building stable channels of mutual settlements in national currencies.” His proposals included expanding correspondent relations between Russian and African banks and facilitating the mutual opening of bank branches.
He named two existing channels: the Bank of Russia’s financial messaging system, Moscow’s alternative to SWIFT, and Africa’s own pan-African payment system.
The summit made those ideas formal. The Russia-Africa Partnership Forum’s action plan for 2027 to 2029 contains 236 measures, including broader use of national currencies, integration of Russian payment systems with the pan‑African PAPSS platform.
PAPSS, run by Afreximbank, was built so African countries could trade with each other in their own currencies. Linking it to Russian systems would give Moscow a way into African trade settlement.
The Crypto Channel
Russia is also pushing a second, less conventional route: A7.
A7 was first launched in late 2024 by the Russian state “defence bank” Promsvyazbank together with fugitive Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor to facilitate cross-border settlements under sanctions. It uses a ruble-backed stablecoin to move money outside Western banks.
The company is expanding in Africa. In 2025, the company opened representative offices in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. In April, reports said it was preparing to expand into Africa, including a planned launch in Togo.
Moscow has promoted A7 openly. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described A7 as Russia’s “first international financial platform” at a Russia-Africa conference in Cairo.
The demand exists. More than 50 million Africans now use cryptocurrencies for everyday financial activities, including cross border payments, savings, and business transactions.
Trade Is Small and Lopsided
The new payment push is meant to support bigger trade targets. The summit set a goal of lifting Russia–Africa trade to about 60 billion USD by 2030, more than twice today’s flows.
Current trade is modest and runs mostly one way. It reached around 27.8 billion USD in 2025, of which 24.3 billion USD were Russian exports against just 3.5 billion USD of African exports.
It is also concentrated. About 70 percent of total trade turnover is still concentrated in North African countries. Food, fertilisers, fuel, and metals account for a significant portion of trade turnover.
Russia says the ruble already dominates settlement. Putin said the Russian ruble has accounted for up to 85% of commercial transactions between Russia and African countries. That figure comes from Russian reports and could not be independently verified.
The Risk for African Governments
The offer touches a real gap. Moving money across African borders is still slow and expensive, and many businesses struggle to get dollars.
But using Russian channels carries risk. A7 exists to get around sanctions. Banks and fintechs that connect to it could face penalties from the United States and Europe, which still control most of Africa’s access to dollars, investment and correspondent banking.
Analysts in Nigeria have warned that any association with cautioned financial networks could attract scrutiny from Western partners.
That leaves African central banks with a choice. They can take cheaper payment routes from Moscow and risk losing Western banking ties, or keep the current system and its costs. Most will probably try to do some of both.
What to Watch
There are three things to watch. First, whether PAPSS actually connects to Russia’s messaging system. Second, whether central banks in Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Togo regulate A7 or tolerate it. Third, whether Washington sanctions African institutions that use it.
The summit produced commitments. The next test is whether African banks and businesses use these systems.
